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LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD IN THE
PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGEMENT
INDUSTRY
Allison Dabbs Garrett and Robert Garis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care costs rose rapidly over the past several years1 and are
expected to continue to grow significantly in the future.2 Prescription
drug prices are one of the largest components of this increase, with
spending on prescription drugs more than quadrupling since 1990.3
According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, increases in
prescription drug prices accounted for 16.7% of the total increase in
health care spending in 2001.4 Legislators, health care professionals,
insurance groups, and consumer groups have been engaged for many
years in a quixotic debate over the health care crisis.

Allison Garrett is the Vice President for Academic Affairs at Oklahoma Christian
University and was previously Vice President of Benefits Compliance and Planning at WalMart Stores, Inc. Robert Garis is an Associate Professor of Pharmacy at the Creighton
University School of Pharmacy and he has studied PBMs for several years. The authors
wish to thank Robert Farmer, a research librarian at Faulkner University’s law school, for
his able assistance.
1
See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health
Statistics Group, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical/t2.asp (last visited
Jan. 28, 2005). In 2000, overall healthcare costs rose by 7.2%, while prescription costs rose
by 16.4%; in 2001 overall costs rose 8.9%, while prescription costs rose 15.9%; in 2002 the
numbers were 14.9% and 9.3%; and in 2003 the numbers were 7.7% and 10.7%, respectively.
Id.; see also KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 1 (2005).
2
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, COMPARING PROJECTED GROWTH IN HEALTH CARE
EXPENDITURES AND THE ECONOMY 1 (2006), http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/
chcm050206oth2.cfm. Health care spending is currently increasing about 2.5% faster than
the growth of the gross domestic product. Id.
3
See PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS, supra note 1, at 1; see also Improving Health Care: A
Dose of Competition, at 3 (July 2004), www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.
Pdf; see also Prescription Drugs: Recent Trends in Utilization, Expenditures and Coverage at
1 (2004), http://ebri.new.matrixgroup.net/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibPrint&content
_id=493.
4
But see Prescription Drugs, supra note 3, at 1. (noting that the growth rate may be
slowing somewhat); Bruce Shutan, Prime Time for PBMs, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, Feb.
2004, http://www.benefitnews.com/detail.cfm?id=5550&terms=%7Car%7C (“Although
employers are expected to face another year of double-digit health plan increases in the
12% to 15% range, they’re gradually reining in prescription drug costs. The pharmacy trend
rate fell to 15.3% from 17.7% between the spring and fall alone, according to Aon’s recently
published twice-annual Health Care Trends Survey”).
*
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One industry largely overlooked in the healthcare debate is
pharmacy benefit management. Pharmacy benefit managers (“PBMs”)
originated during the 1970s to serve as fiscal intermediaries by
adjudicating prescription drug claims by paper and then, in the 1980s,
electronically. When a health plan participant leaves a prescription at a
pharmacy, the pharmacy verifies through the PBM that the participant
has coverage, what copay is required, whether the plan covers the drug,
and whether pre-approvals are required to fill the prescription. Once the
prescription is filled, the pharmacy transmits details regarding the
patient, health plan number, prescription, and price to the PBM. The
PBM responds by approving or disapproving the transaction or by
instructing the pharmacy to obtain additional information. The PBM
then seeks payment from the health plan, whether self-insured or fully
insured, and forwards the appropriate payment to the retail pharmacy.
The function of PBMs has changed over the years from simply
processing prescription transactions to managing the pharmacy benefit
for health plans.5
Today, PBMs negotiate drug discounts with
pharmaceutical manufacturers, provide drug utilization reviews6 and
disease management, and, in some instances, create a formulary that
encourages or even requires health plan participants to use preferred
formulary products to treat their conditions.7 A common structure is the
three-tier plan. The first tier of co-payment, which is the lowest,
typically provides for a copay of around $10 for generic drugs. The
middle tier, with a slightly higher copay, allows for the purchase of
brand-name drugs that have been determined by the PBM to be the
preferred brand drugs in the formulary for treating a particular disease
or condition. The third tier, allows plan participants to purchase nonpreferred brand drugs with the payment of the highest copay.
Within the United States, approximately two-thirds of all
prescriptions filled pass through the hands of PBMs in one way or
another. Over the past decade, significant changes have occurred in the
PBM industry, but regulation of the PBMs has not kept pace with those
See, e.g., Regina Sharlow Johnson, PBMs: Ripe for Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 323
(2002) (describing the functions of PBMs and the lack of an appropriate regulatory scheme);
Dept. Health & Human Servs., Report to the President: Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending,
Utilization, and Prices (April 2000).
6
Dep’t Health & Human Servs., U.S. Food & Drug Admin, The Prescription Drug
Marketing Act Report to Congress, (June 2001); Sheila Shulman, Pharmacy Benefit Management
Companies (PBMs), Why Should We Be Interested?, 14 PHARMACOECON 49 (1998).
7
Insurance Changes Alter Drug-Taking Behavior, http://www.reflector.com/health/
content/shared-auto/healthnews/drug/516324.html; see also Dr. Haiden Huskamp,
Formularies and Cost Sharing Issues for Medicare Part D (Oct. 8, 2004).
5
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changes. Despite their involvement in the fulfillment of prescriptions,
regulation of these entities is largely ad hoc. The PBMs’ practices have
been subjected to increasing scrutiny in the past few years and several
states have attempted to regulate them in light of the dearth of federal
regulation.
In addition, PBMs, along with pharmaceutical
manufacturers, are the targets of increased litigation.
The scrutiny of PBMs is likely to increase over the next few years.
For example, the passage of the Medicare prescription drug bill involves
PBMs in the administration of drug discount cards for seniors who lack
prescription drug coverage and in the administration of various plans
that provide the prescription drug benefit.8
According to an industry auditor frequently hired by health plans to
audit their PBMs’ performance, in more than 400 audits “we have never
found a single situation where something wasn’t wrong.”9 Given the
amount of litigation in the pharmaceutical and PBM industries, as well
as attempts by the states to regulate the PBMs, change in the PBM
industry is ineluctable.10 Yet, attempts at state regulation and the ad hoc
constraints on behavior that litigation creates will not correct problems in
the PBM industry quickly and efficiently. This article explores how the
PBM industry operates, current regulations affecting the industry,
problems within the industry, and provides alternatives to the current
unworkable approach that will help to level the playing field between
health plans and PBMs by reducing information asymmetry.

8
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395w-141 (2000); Medicare Prescription Drug Discount Card, Interim Final Rule and
notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 69840 (Dec. 15, 2003).
9
Melissa Davis, Medco, Peers Face New Test from Clients, THESTREET.COM, (Oct. 24, 2004)
http://www.thestreet.com/_yahoo/stocks/melissadavid/10190002_2.html. The auditor,
Susan Hayes:
remembers one PBM waiting 10 months to carry out a contract change
that would have saved its customer $10 million—and then a long fight
to recover the money. She remembers other PBMs refusing to supply
information until their clients sued in court. She remembers PBMs
retaliating against her company “big time” and one even banning her
firm from auditing its contracts. . . . The industry needs to be
overhauled.
Id.
10
See Davis, supra note 9 (in which co-author Robert Garis, predicts that “there is going
to be a cataclysm in the industry”).
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II. THE PBM INDUSTRY
PBMs constitute a growing and lucrative industry. However, the
industry is also quite complex. This Part will explore the PBM industry,
discussing the basic attributes of PBMs, as well as the relationships PBMs
have with health plans, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and retail
pharmacies.
There are between forty and sixty PBMs operating in the United
States, but most of these entities are small.11 The industry is dominated
by three firms: Caremark RX, Inc., Medco Health Solutions, Inc.,12 and
Express Scripts, Inc.13 PBM size can be measured in several ways: by the
number of prescriptions they process, the dollar value of those
prescriptions, or the number of covered lives (which is the industry
terminology for the number of health plan participants a PBM serves).
Caremark bought Advance PCS, another large PBM, in 2004 and
together the combined entity serves 20% of the covered lives in the PBM
market. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., serves another 12%, while Express
Scripts, Inc., serves 10%.14
The PBMs’ business model has proven extremely lucrative. In 2006,
Express Scripts had a net income of $474 million on revenues of $17.7
Improving Health Care, supra note 3 (estimating 60 PBMs); Robert F. Atlas, The Role of
PBMs in Implementing the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 2004 HEALTH AFFAIRS, (Oct. 28,
2004) at W4-504, 506, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w4.504
(estimating 40-50 PBMs).
12
Medco Health Solutions, Inc. is the successor in interest to Merck-Medco Managed
Care, LLC. Regarding Merck Medco’s history, see generally Nancy A. Nichols, Medicine,
Management, and Mergers: An Interview with Merck’s P. Roy Vagelos, HARV. BUS. REV. 113
(1994).
13
Joyce Frieden, Consolidation, Lawsuits: Mail Order Rx Numbers May Be on the Rise,
OB/GYN NEWS, Apr. 15, 2004. The article describes the concentration of PBMs, stating:
The PBMs see the market differently. “This is a fairly fragmented
industry,” said Phil Blando, spokesman for the Pharmaceutical Care
Management Association, a Washington-based trade association for
PBMs. He noted that his organization has roughly 60 members,
although “there is really a core group of seven or eight PBMs, none of
which has more than the high teens in terms of market share or
revenues.” Besides the independent PBMs; several of the larger
insurance companies have their own PBM units, he added.
Id.
14
A Guide to Drug Cost Management Strategies, from AIS’s exclusive quarterly survey of
PBMs conducted for Drug Benefit News, http://www.aishealth.com/MarketData/
PharmBenMgmt/PBM_market01.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2007); see also Roy Harris, The
Year of Living Strategically, CFO MAG., Jan. 2007, at 29, 31 (noting that currently, CVS is
trying to acquire Caremark, a move that “in theory, might allow the company to help
create better deals for consumers, while it gives itself new revenue opportunities”).
11
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billion,15 Medco Health Solutions, Inc. made $630 million on revenues of
$42.5 billion during the same period,16 and Caremark RX, Inc. made $1.1
billion on revenues of $36.8 billion in 2006.17
PBMs profit: (1) from operating their own mail order pharmacies;
(2) from providing services such as drug utilization review, rebate
administration, and data mining; and (3) from negotiating with groups
such as health plans, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and retail
pharmacies. Through the process of negotiation with each group, the
PBMs either make money or reduce expenses in various ways.
Typically, there are four ways that PBMs make a profit. First, they
take a share of the “ingredient cost” by contracting to reimburse retail
pharmacies for drugs at one rate, while charging health plans a higher
rate. Second, PBMs receive the fees and rebates mentioned above from
drug manufacturers.18 Third, the PBMs charge health plans a processing
fee for each prescription filled.19 Finally, the PBMs compete to some
degree with the retail pharmacies with which they contract. The PBMs
each have a mail order branch and direct a portion of the pharmacy
transactions through their own mail order branches. Some PBMs have
also begun to offer their own discount cards to cash-paying patients who
do not have health plans. This allows PBMs to generate additional
revenue, while offering uninsured customers somewhat lower rates on
pharmaceuticals.
The federal government has studied the role of PBMs several times
over the past decade.20 In the Medicare Modernization Act, passed in
15
EXPRESS SCRIPTS, INC. ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR 2006, at 55,
http://www.secinfo.com/dr/ZUm.u2.htm.
16
MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS, INC. ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR 2006, at 69.
17
CAREMARK RX, INC. ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR 2006, at 44.
18
See PBMs’ revenue sources, rebate accounting procedures explained, DRUG COST
MANAGEMENT REPORT (Jan. 2003), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NIV/is_1_4/
ai_97592327/print (describing access rebates, a type of rebate given for placing a particular
drug on the PBM’s formulary); Chris Nee, Uncovering the Mysteries Behind Rebates, DRUG
COST MANAGEMENT REPORT (June 2002), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_m0NKV/is_6_3/ai_87799122/print (describing the other amounts manufacturers pay
to PBMs for marketing practices that increase their market share of particular drugs).
19
See Barbara Martinez, Two Hats: Firms Paid to Trim Drug Costs Also Toil for Drug
Makers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2003, available at http://www.pbmwatch.org/update15_
100703.html (describing the per transaction processing charge has decreased significantly
over the past several years to between twenty and thirty cents per transaction from about
one dollar per transaction).
20
Cong. Budget Office, Prescription Drug Pricing in the Private Sector, at Glossary (Jan.
2007) [hereinafter CBO Report]; General Accounting Office, Federal Employees’ Health
Benefits: Effects of Using Pharmacy Benefit Managers on Health Plans, Enrollees, and Pharmacies
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December of 2004, Congress included a provision requiring the Federal
Trade Comission to study the mail order pharmaceutical business to
determine whether the PBMs were engaged in self-dealing.21 The FTC
issued its report in September of 2005, finding that self-dealing by the
PBMs did not result in noticeably higher prices.22
The dominant players in the PBM industry process the prescriptions
dispensed to approximately 200 million Americans, thus earning huge
annual profits.23 Not only are PBMs extremely profitable, they also
appear on Fortune’s list of the fastest growing companies in America.24
Although most large health plans turn to one of the dominant PBMs,
there are at least twenty PBMs that have systems and retail pharmacy
networks that can handle large health plans.
There are two main types of PBMs. The first is the full-service PBM
that recommends plan design, handles all plan interaction with retail
pharmacies, and negotiates rebates and other financial incentives with
manufacturers. The second type, PBMs that are not full-service,
sometimes contract out one or more of these functions to a third party.
Each type of PBM negotiates with health plans and retail pharmacies
and, directly or through a third party, with pharmaceutical
manufacturers. The PBM also serves as the intermediary among these
three groups.

(Jan. 2003) [hereinafter GAO-03-196]; Health Care Financing Admin., Study of
Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry, at 41 (June 2001) [hereinafter Contract No. 50097-0399/0097].
21
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-101 (West 2004) (quoting Pub. L. 108-173, Title I, §110, Dec. 8,
2003, 117 Stat. 2174 (a)) (“The Federal Trade Commission shall conduct a study of
differences in payment amounts for pharmacy services provided to enrollees in group
health plans that utilize pharmacy benefit managers.”); cf. Conference Agreement, 149
Cong. Rec. H. 11877 (2003). See also GAO-03-196, supra note 20 (noting that the purpose of
the study was to determine whether self-dealing, which had been identified in an earlier,
privately funded study, occurs); James Langenfeld & Robert Maness, The Cost of PBM “SelfDealing” Under a Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit (Sept. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.mpaginc.com/news/pbm report.pdf.
22
Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Ownership of Mail-Order Pharmacies, Fed. Trade
Commission (Sept. 6, 2005); see also GAO-03-196, supra note 20 (serving as an example of
government agencies studying the PBM industry); Contract No. 500-97-0399/0097, supra
note 20 (same).
23
Improving Health Care, supra note 3, at 14.
24
See Market-share Analysis Shows Changing PBM Climate, Growth as Medco Spins Off,
(Aug. 29, 2003), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi)m0NKV/is_10_4/ai_107648547
(noting that “FORTUNE magazine’s list of the 100 fastest growing companies [in 2003] . . .
includes five PBMs or PBM parent companies among its 22 health care firms.”).
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A. PBMs’ Relationships with Health Plans
Sponsors of group health plans include employers and unions.
Employers may also make health maintenance organizations (“HMOs”)
available to their employees. The HMOs also deal with PBMs to
negotiate pricing for plan participants. Plan sponsors typically choose a
PBM by sending a request for proposals (“RFP”) to several large PBMs.
Most health plans retain a consultant from a high-profile firm such as
Hewitt or Towers-Perrin to advise them during the RFP process. The
primary concerns of the health plans typically include pricing, customer
service, and pharmacy plan design.
Pricing is partially based on the reimbursement rate for prescription
drugs. This rate is typically expressed as the Average Wholesale Price25
(“AWP”) (a standard industry pricing that, curiously, is neither average
nor wholesale) less a negotiated percentage for brand name drugs. AWP
has been defined as:
A publicly available list price for sales of drugs by
wholesales to pharmacies or other providers, the AWP is
not the actual price that wholesales charge but is more
like a sticker price in the automobile industry. The AWP
is used as the basis for setting payment rates to
pharmacies.26
A related concept is the Average Manufacturer Price (“AMP”), defined
as:
the average price paid to manufacturers for drugs
distributed through retail pharmacies. It includes all
forms of discounts given to wholesalers and to
pharmacies, but it does not include rebates paid by
manufacturers to third-party payers. The AMP is used
to calculate the rebates that manufacturers of brand25
Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy, A Guide to Understanding Common Prescription
Drug Pricing Terms, at 5 (defining AWP as the price assigned to a drug and is listed in the
Red Book, First DataBank or Medispan). AWP is a “suggested list price, and is typically not
what is paid as buyers may negotiate lower prices through the inclusion of discounts,
rebates or free products.” Id. AWPs, which are used to establish reimbursement rates for
drugs, are published in the Drug Topics Red Book and other sources. Id.; see Floor Statement of
United States Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.senate.
gov/~finance/press/Gpress/2007/prg010807.pdf. (pointing out that a standing joke
within the industry says the acronym stands for “Ain’t What’s Paid”).
26
CBO Report, supra note 20, at Glossary.
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name drugs are required to give to federal and state
governments for sales to Medicaid beneficiaries.27
In other words, the AMP is the price paid by wholesalers to drug
manufacturers; the wholesaler then marks up the drugs and sells them to
retail pharmacies.
For generic drugs,28 the pricing is the Maximum Allowable Cost
(“MAC”), which is often expressed as an aggregate discount off the AWP
(for example, an aggregate discount on generics equal to or greater than
AWP, such as 55%).29 The MAC is “an upper payment limit on the
ingredient costs for a multiple-source drug.”30 While plan sponsors may
operate under the illusion that the MAC is actually the maximum price
allowable, there are often multiple MAC prices. PBMs use lower MAC
prices to reimburse pharmacies, while higher MAC prices are charged to
plan sponsors, increasing the spread retained by the PBM. PBMs can
also increase their spreads by charging the plan sponsor a higher MAC
price. For example, in a new contract between the plan sponsor and
PBM, the PBM may give up more in rebate dollars while, unknown to
the plan sponsor, the PBM starts using a MAC list with a higher unit
price to maintain profit expectations. Pricing negotiations will also relate
to the dispensing fee, which is a flat price per prescription paid to the
pharmacies for filling the prescriptions and counseling the patients. In
addition, pricing negotiations will deal with the rebates from
pharmaceutical manufacturers that will be passed on to the plan
sponsor, pricing for mail order fulfillment, drug utilization reviews and
disease management, as well as administrative fees charged by the PBM
for its services.
On January 1, 2005, Medicare changed its reimbursement approach
from AWP to Average Sales Price (“ASP”). Although Medicare uses this

Id.
Generic drugs are also referred to within the industry as “multi-source drugs,” while
brand name drugs are referred to as “single-source drugs.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2000)
and 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.517, 414.904 (2007).
29
See Academy of Managed Care Physicians, A Guide to Understanding Common
Prescription Drug Pricing Terms (defining MAC as the price that a health plan establishes as
the “maximum cost per unit of medication (tablet, capsule, etc.) for that product . . . . Each
health plan determines its own MAC, and uses its own formula to arrive at the MAC
price.”). Health plan administrators do not have the time, systems, or considerable
expertise that would be necessary to perform these calculations in house. Instead, each
health plan contracts with the PBM for these services.
30
CBO Report, supra note 20, at Glossary.
27
28
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method, some non-governmental payers are also starting to use ASP.31
For example, several Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans peg their
reimbursement rates to Medicare rates.32 Additionally, on January 1,
2007, pricing throughout the industry changed somewhat with the
introduction of a new pricing approach as to state Medicaid programs.
Under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005,33 Congress imposed a federal
upper limit (“FUL”) on the federal matching funds that state programs
receive.34 Each drug’s FUL is now based on the AMP.35 While the AMP
does not apply to prices charged by the PBMs to health plans, it will
likely become another accepted source for drug pricing and, if the AMP
prices are lower, this may exert some downward pressure on the prices
paid by health plans.
In addition to paying PBMs for the drugs purchased by plan
participants, plan sponsors also pay PBMs for providing specialty
pharmacy services. Specialty pharmaceuticals include “injectable and
infusion therapies, high-cost ($5,000 and up per patient per year)
therapies, and therapies that require complex care.”36 These drugs are
typically very expensive and may require special handling, such as
refrigeration.
Some PBMs also have mail order facilities and may try to shift plan
participants to fulfillment of prescriptions through mail order rather
than at retail pharmacies.37 This approach is often used for maintenance
drugs, such as those for hypertension, asthma, and diabetes to avoid a
trip to a retail pharmacy and to lower the patient’s copay. When a PBM
operates its own mail order facility, it can profit from a single transaction
by processing the transaction as an intermediary and by receiving the
dispensing fee and a markup on the drugs.

Commercial Payers are Starting to Use Medicare’s Average Sales Price, SPECIALTY
PHARMACY NEWS (Mar. 2006), http://www.aishealth.com/DrugCosts/DBN_Medicare_
Sales_Price.html.
32
Id.
33
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2000).
34
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(e)(4).
35
See generally GAO, Medicaid Federal Upper Limits, GAO-07-239R, (Dec. 22, 2006).
36
Defining Specialty Pharmacy: Services, Markets and Player, 3 DRUG COST MGMT.
REP., No. 7 (July 2002).
37
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 (2000); cf. Conference Agreement, 149 Cong. Rec. H. 11877
(2003). Concern over whether this occurs caused Congress to include in the Medicare
Modernization Act, the following language: “The Federal Trade Commission shall conduct
a study of differences in payment amounts for pharmacy services to enrollees in group
health plans that utilize pharmacy benefit managers.” Id.
31
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Plan sponsors evaluating proposals from several PBMs are
concerned with customer service elements of the bid package. Sponsors
will review data concerning timeliness and responsiveness to contacts
from plan participants and network pharmacies. Plan sponsors are also
concerned with geo-access to network pharmacies, such that plan
participants have access to conveniently located pharmacies. However,
depending on the nature of the plan sponsor, the pharmacy network
may be limited. For example, if the plan sponsor has a single facility, a
nearby pharmacy may give better rates to the PBM in order to assure
that plan participants patronize it. On the other hand, a plan sponsor
with a geographically dispersed work force must assure that its
employees have access to network pharmacies wherever they are
located.
As part of the plan design aspects of the bid, PBMs often propose
plan design features that should increase rebate payments to the PBM,
drive up generic utilization rates, or require preapproval of high cost or
frequently abused drugs.38 The predominant plan structure is tiered.
Under the tiered approach, the patient can obtain non-preferred drugs,
but must pay a higher copayment. According to the Congressional
Budget Office, a “formulary” is:
a list of drugs approved for coverage under a drug
benefit. Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) working on
behalf of health plans determine which drugs are
therapeutically similar. Then, for such brand-name
drugs with several close substitutes, PBMs negotiate
with manufacturers for lower prices and rebates in
return for placing the manufacturers’ drugs on their
formularies.
The patients served by a PBM may have access to only
those drugs on a formulary (in the case of a closed
formulary) or may have access to all prescription drugs
but at different levels of copayments or other conditions
(in the case of an open formulary).39

38
Although the lack of transparency in the industry obscures the facts, PBMs may make
more money creating incentives for consumers to purchase brand name drugs than by
creating incentives for the use of generic drugs through a formulary.
39
CBO Report, supra note 20, at Glossary. This CBO definition of “formulary” may not
be entirely accurate. For example, for plan sponsors, it is unclear whether the PBM is
actually negotiating for lower prices or just for rebates. Further, plan sponsors do not have
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Under a formulary approach, the structure of the pharmacy plan
provides for lower copays when preferred drugs are used. In theory, the
health plan will receive better pricing because placement of the preferred
drug on the formulary should help to drive market share increases for
that individual drug.
In addition to providing for therapeutic substitution (drugs that
address the same disease or condition in roughly the same manner), the
formulary may require generic substitution. That is, the formulary may
require plan participants to accept the generic drug, which is the
chemical equivalent of the brand-name drug. For example, a generic
cholesterol-reducing drug may carry a $10 copay, while the brand-name
drug may carry a $20 copay. This provides an economic incentive to
plan participants to choose the less expensive generic drug over the more
expensive brand name drug.
Formularies can be designed not only to channel participants toward
generic drugs, but also to channel participants to those drugs deemed
most cost-effective for treating a particular disease or condition.
Preferred drugs are those that the PBM’s pharmacy and therapeutics
(“P&T”) committee selects for a given disease or condition, though it is
unclear to what extent the selection is based on clinical merit as opposed
to rebates. In addition, some formularies use therapeutic substitution,
which is a switch to a drug that, while not chemically equivalent, has the
same therapeutic effects as the prescribed drug.
The formulary may also be structured to maximize manufacturer
rebates by causing plan participants to shift from one manufacturer’s
drug to another’s.40 In theory, maximizing rebates lowers the cost of the
pharmacy plan for all plan participants, but this occurs only if the PBM

access to the information that would be necessary to determine whether the cost of
rebatable drugs is actually lower than the cost of comparable drugs. Id.
40
ANNA COOK & THOMAS KORNFIELD ET AL., THE ROLE OF PBMS IN MANAGING DRUG
COSTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR A MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT 19 (2000). (“The ability of PBMs to
manage utilization and substitute one drug for another on their formulary motivates
manufacturers to offer rebates.”). See also Advance PCS, Annual Report, (Form 10k-405) at
6 (June 29, 2000), http://sec.edgar-online/2000/06/29/10/0000950134-00-005401/Section8.
asp (“We have historically derived our clinical revenues primarily from formulary rebates
and volume discounts received from pharmaceutical manufacturers.”); Robert B. Goldberg,
Managing the Pharmacy Benefit: The Formulary System, 3 J. MANAGED CARE PHARM. 565-73
(1997).
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passes those savings along to the plan. The judicious use of appropriate
generic products also lowers plan costs. 41
The various categories of drugs included in a health plan’s
formulary are called “tiers,” with different copays and requirements for
each tier. A typical plan may have four tiers, ranging from drugs that
the P&T committee deems to be extremely cost effective and for which
the copays will be the lowest, to those brand name drugs that have less
costly alternatives. Differences in copays and pre-approval requirements
are designed to influence plan participants, together with their doctors,
to choose less costly alternatives, such as generic equivalents, for their
diseases or conditions. Because these tiers influence market behavior,
manufacturers may pay bigger rebates to the PBMs in connection with
their administration of health plans that have more aggressive
formularies.
B. PBMs’ Relationships with Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Generally, PBMs negotiate with pharmaceutical manufacturers for
rebates associated with use of the manufacturers’ brand-name drugs. In
effect, the manufacturers pay PBMs to increase their market shares. For
example, two drug manufacturers may have similar but competing
drugs to treat asthma. The manufacturers may pay the PBM rebates or
other funds for hitting sales targets or increasing the market share of an
individual drug. The PBM may also receive rebates for placing the
manufacturer’s drug on its formulary, which will tend to shift usage to
the preferred drug.
In addition to receiving rebates, PBMs are compensated by
manufacturers for various services, such as distributing, adjudicating,

Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (“AMCP”), Comments Regarding the June 26,
2003 Joint FTC-DOJ Hearings on Health Care and Competition Law and Policy, (Pharmaceuticals:
Formulary) at 2 (Aug. 5, 2003) (“[A] well-desired, properly administered formulary will
assist in the effective management of a patient’s overall health care.”). See also U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance, Providing Prescription Drug Coverage Through Medicare: The Role of
Pharmacy Benefit Managers, 106th Cong. (2000), at 4-5, in which testimony was given before
the Committee that:
PBMs may develop relationships with manufacturers that provide
lower pricing (through rebates) when a particular drug is on the
formulary. The level of rebates will vary by manufacturer and
prescription drug. In general, the level of the rebates increases if the
PBM achieves a greater market share for a drug within a defined class
of prescriptions with similar therapeutic effects.
Id.
41
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and tracking drug-sample vouchers.42 PBMs may also receive marketing
or educational money, administration fees43 (fees associated with
providing data to the pharmaceutical companies) for conducting
pharmacoeconomics studies, outcomes studies, and disease management
studies. The amounts earned by the PBMs may be nothing more than
disguised rebates, but because they are not characterized as rebates, they
are not passed on to plan sponsors. AdvancePCS explains these other
revenues as follows:
We also earn other revenue from pharmaceutical
manufacturers for services such as formulary support
services, outcomes studies and clinical trials. These
services are negotiated separately with each
pharmaceutical manufacturer and specify the services
we are to perform and the revenues and fees we are to
earn based on the delivery or completion of the services.
We also earn revenues from our customers (primarily
managed care organizations) for disease management
services provided by Accordant, our wholly owned
subsidiary. . . .44
The PBMs’ ability to negotiate effectively with manufacturers has
been criticized in recent years. Some argue that the PBMs cannot
negotiate effectively on a drug-by-drug basis because drug
manufacturers insist on bundling the drugs and providing aggregate
pricing.45 Bundling may make it difficult to replace branded drugs with
generic drugs as generics become available. If a competing brand drug
enters the public domain when its patent expires, making generic
equivalents available, the PBM should notify plan members to switch to
the generic drug and save on co-payments. However, this rarely occurs.
As already explained, PBMs peddle their formularies to health plan
sponsors. For large health plans, which may have more than one million
covered lives, the potential increase in market share from adopting a
PBM’s formulary may give the PBM additional leverage with the drug
42
David M. Katz, Drug Discount Peddlers, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 28, 2005,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5079733?f=search.
43
Id. For example, the PBM may be paid to manage vouchers or coupons offered by the
drug manufacturer. Id.
44
Advance PCS, Annual Report, (Form 10k/A) at 52 (July 29, 2003), http://sec.edgaronline/2003/07/29/0001193125-03-025659/Section8.asp.
45
John Carroll, When Success Sours: PBMs Under Scrutiny, 11 MANAGED CARE 20-26
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.badfaithinsurance.org/reference/GMDCPBM/0031a.
htm.
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manufacturers. And placing one manufacturer’s cholesterol-lowering
drug on the formulary as a preferred drug could help to shift market
share away from competitors’ drugs in the same therapeutic class.46 For
this reason, drug manufacturers may pay a combination of rebates,
marketing fees, and administrative fees to PBMs in exchange for
placement on a formulary or for providing marketing data to the
manufacturers.
C. PBMs’ Relationships with Retail Pharmacies
PBMs establish networks of pharmacies at which health plan
participants can have their prescriptions filled. There is tension between
having a broad network of retail pharmacies that provide plan
participants with many retail choices to have prescriptions filled and
creating a narrow network of pharmacies, although few PBMs establish
restricted networks. Retail pharmacies are highly motivated to acquiesce
to PBMs’ pricing demands to assure that they will be included in the
PBM’s network of retail pharmacies, resulting in an increase in the
pharmacy’s market share. Exclusion from the network means that plan
participants’ claims cannot be processed automatically and the burden of
additional paperwork will cause participants to avoid retail pharmacies
that are not included in their network. The retail pharmacies are
generally offered a “take it or leave it” deal to be included in the
network, with only the largest pharmacy chains having any ability to
negotiate with the PBMs.
PBMs offer a dispensing fee to each group of pharmacies that will be
included in the network. The dispensing fee is a flat fee paid to the
pharmacy that ostensibly compensates the pharmacy for overhead while
providing some measure of profit. The dispensing fee charged to the
plan sponsor may be higher than the dispensing fee paid to the retail
pharmacies, meaning that the PBM keeps the spread as profit. 47

46
Id.; see also Katz, supra note 42. Katz describes how Express Scripts, Inc., one of the
three largest PBMs, removed Pfizer’s Lipitor from its formulary in favor of Merck’s Zocor.
Id. This move was unusual, because Express Scripts noted that it was influenced by the fact
that Zocor would soon come off of patent, meaning that generic equivalents should be
available, whereas Lipitor had another eleven years left on its patents. Id.
47
See Katz, supra note 42 (noting, “Another target of scrutiny is how PBMs can unduly
profit from price spreads. In a typical arrangement, the manager at the PBM agrees with a
corporate client on a guaranteed price that the client will pay for a drug. If the manager can
hash out a lower price with the drugstore chain, the PBM pockets the difference”); see also
Robert I. Garis & Bartholomew E. Clark, The Spread: Pilot Study of an Undocumented Source of
Pharmacy Benefit Manager Revenue, 44 J. AM. PHARM. ASSOC. 15-21 (2004) (finding the
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III. CURRENT REGULATION OF THE PBM INDUSTRY
Existing regulation of the PBM industry is a patchwork of state and
federal laws and regulations from assorted government agencies, none of
which has primary responsibility for regulating this important industry.
However, because there is no single, comprehensive regulatory scheme,
the industry has been left largely to its own devices with respect to
several significant issues. Litigation and attempts at the state level to
pass regulatory fixes have resulted in slow and inconsistent approaches
to the significant issues affecting this segment of the health care industry.
This Part will discuss federal and state regulation of the PBM industry.
A. Federal Regulation of the PBM Industry
There are many different federal regulations that affect the PBM
industry, however no federal agency has overall responsibility for the
industry’s regulation. Further, existing regulations fail to address the
concerns for fraud and self-dealing discussed in Part I of this article.
Among the federal regulations that address PBM behavior are the
Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse statute48 and anti-kickback
rules.49 Congress amended the statute in 1977 to expand its reach
beyond bribes, kickbacks, and rebates by making any form of
remuneration subject to the penalty provisions.50 In 1980, Congress
added the scienter requirement to allow individuals whose conduct is
inadvertent to avoid prosecution.51 Conduct proscribed by the act must
be knowing or willful for liability to attach.52 Penalties for violation of
the anti-kickback law include up to five years in prison, criminal fines of
up to $25,000, and civil penalties of up to $50,000.53

“possibility of substantial and widely varying differences in the spread and spread
percentage between PBMs for brand name and generic medications” and noting that “[a]
more transparent business model for the PBM industry could produce better relations with
PBM clients and business partners, including community pharmacies.”).
48
See Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(13) (2000). The statute protects discounts or other price reductions as long as they are
“properly disclosed and appropriately reflected.” Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h) (2004).
49
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000).
50
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1),(2) (2000); H.R. Rep. No. 95-393, at 53 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3056.
51
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1),(2) (2000); H.R. Rep. No. 96-1167, at 59 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5572; see also H.R. Rep. No. 92-231, at 107 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093.
52
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(7) (2000).
53
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000).
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The PBMs may, however, qualify for certain safe harbors under the
anti-kickback rules.54
The anti-kickback statute includes several
statutory exemptions to prohibited activities.55 The Office of the
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services was
charged by Congress with drafting safe harbors to protect certain types
of common payment practices from kickback liability. Accordingly, new
safe harbors that apply to electronic prescribing were adopted in 2005.56
Some scholars have noted the difficulty of applying these safe
harbors to PBM activities.57 These safe harbors may not, however,
protect PBMs from liability for practices of the types discussed in Part IV
of this Article, including channeling of prescriptions to their own
fulfillment facilities, drug switching, kickbacks, and other pricing and
rebate practices. Further, the effectiveness of these statutes to curb PBM
behavior has been criticized, with one author noting: “Existing federal
legislation aimed at eliminating healthcare fraud fails to redress the
potential for conflicts of interest introduced by vertical integration.”58
In addition to the anti-kickback laws and the regulations
implementing them, PBMs may also be subject to fiduciary duties under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).59
ERISA applies to employee benefit plans created by employers “engaged
in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce.”60 It
54
See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h) (stating that an arms-length transaction qualifies for the
safe harbor protection).
55
See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (exemptions to the anti-kickback statute include: properly
disclosed discounts under a federal healthcare program; compensation paid to a bona fide
employee; amounts paid by a vendor to a group purchasing organization if certain
conditions are met; waivers of co-insurance by federally-qualified health centers; and
remuneration paid as part of a risk-sharing arrangement). See generally Dept. of Health and
Human Servs, Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Statutory Exception to the AntiKickback Statute for Shared Risk Arrangements, 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,504 (Nov. 19, 1999).
56
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952.
57
Greg Radinsky, The Spotlight on PBMs: Federal Enforcement of the Anti-Kickback Statute
on the Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry, 36 J. HEALTH L. 213 (2003). See generally
Mark Learn, Applying Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback Laws to Disease Management
Programs: Ramifications for the Pharmaceutical Industry and a Regulatory Proposal, 69 TEMP. L.
REV. 245 (1996) (providing a general discussion of the anti-kickback rules and their possible
application to PBM programs).
58
Elizabeth L. Mitchell, The Potential for Self-Interested Behavior by Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Through Vertical Integration with Pharmacy Benefit Managers: The Need for a
New Regulatory Approach, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 162 (1999).
59
29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000); see also AccessRx Program, D.C. Stat. § 48-831.01(2001)
(imposing a fiduciary duty on all PBM’s to their covered entities).
60
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a-b) (2000); see
generally Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA’s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311 (1998)
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provides that a fiduciary must “discharge his duties with respect to the
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”61 If the
fiduciary fails to discharge its duties, the fiduciary is personally liable for
money damages, restitution, and “such other equitable or remedial relief
as the court may deem appropriate.”62 The Supreme Court has
characterized the test for whether an entity is a fiduciary under ERISA as
a functional test that depends on the control and authority exercised over
the plan by the entity.63 Regulation of PBMs under ERISA depends upon
the characterization of PBMs as fiduciaries owing certain duties to plan
participants. PBMs have resisted this characterization and routinely
insist that a disclaimer of fiduciary status under ERISA be included in
their contracts with health plans.
The question of whether fiduciary duties apply to PBMs under
ERISA has been explored in numerous cases. For example, in Glanton v.
AdvancePCS Inc.,64 participants in several employer plans sued
AdvancePCS alleging that the PBM had “secretly been keeping the
spread between what it charge[d] the plans for drugs and what it [paid]
suppliers.”65 Plaintiffs argued that AdvancePCS was a plan fiduciary, as
defined by ERISA, and that they had standing to sue AdvancePCS for
breach of its fiduciary duty.66 While only deciding the standing issue,
the court noted: “It follows that plaintiffs here are authorized to sue
AdvancePCS for breach of fiduciary duty.”67
Similarly, in Bickley v. Caremark RX, Inc.,68 the plaintiff brought a
class action lawsuit alleging that Caremark was a plan fiduciary under
ERISA and breached its various fiduciary duties.69 According to the
complaint, Caremark enriched itself “through undisclosed discounts,
rebates, coupons and other forms of compensation from drug companies
and pharmacies.”70 Caremark had successfully moved to dismiss at the
(noting that ERISA does not apply to plans sponsored by the government and by
churches).
61
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000).
62
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
63
See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (holding that entities that
perform services for a plan but are not classified as fiduciaries under ERISA are not subject
to money damages).
64
465 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2005).
65
Id. at 1124.
66
Id. Whether an entity is specifically named as a plan fiduciary is not dispositive of the
issue. Rather, it depends on the functions of the entity. Id.
67
Id.
68
461 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2006).
69
Id. at 1326-27.
70
Id. at 1327-28.
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trial court level “based on lack of standing, failure to state a claim, and
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”71 Although the plan noted
that participants had the right to sue for plan fiduciaries’ breach of their
duties, the court explained that this language “merely recites plan
participants’ general rights under ERISA and does not excuse a
participant from satisfying the exhaustion requirement.”72 However,
because the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court
appropriately dismissed the complaint, it did not reach the specific issue
of whether Caremark was acting as a plan fiduciary or whether
Caremark’s alleged conduct violated its fiduciary duties.73
Central States SE & SW Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco
Managed Care, LLC, was similar to Bickley in that the plaintiffs in
consolidated class actions alleged that the PBM was a plan fiduciary and
had violated its fiduciary duties.74 The issue was whether plaintiffs had
standing to sue the PBM. Plaintiffs alleged that Medco “systematically
misused its fiduciary authority, and its management of formularies and
drug-switching programs, among other purposes, (i) to increase the
market share in specific drugs of its parent company Merck, and (ii) to
divert rebates from drug manufacturers to itself, both at the expense of
the Plans.”75 At issue before the Second Circuit was whether a proposed
class settlement was appropriate as to those class members that were
self-funded plans; thus, the court did not reach the issue of whether the
PBM was a fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA.76
Whether the services of PBMs, or any other entity performing
services for a plan, make that entity a fiduciary depends on the extent to
which “he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets . . . or . . . he
has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.”77
PBMs generally insist on language in its contract with the plan
sponsor specifically disclaiming fiduciary status. This type of language,

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
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Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1326-27.
433 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 187.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A) (2000).
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though, is not dispositive.78 Arguably, PBMs do exercise discretionary
authority by virtue of the adjudicatory function they perform with
respect to pharmacy claims by plan participants. The effects of the
application of ERISA to PBMs’ activities include prohibitions under
ERISA on self-dealing,79 the application of fiduciary standards to the
PBMs,80 and subjection of the PBMs’ activities to reporting and
disclosure obligations under ERISA.81
One state law, Maine’s Unfair Prescription Drug Practices Act
(“UPDPA”), provides that PBMs are fiduciaries and, as such, have to
disclose conflicts of interest and remuneration from (and other types of
financial arrangements with) manufacturers. 82 UPDPA makes each
PBM a “fiduciary” to its client and requires disclosure of any conflicts of
interest and any remuneration to the PBM by a prescription drug
manufacturer or labeler.83 The Act also mandates disclosure of other
types of information upon request,84 as well as disgorgement of any
profits inuring from self-dealing.85
Violation of the UPDPA is
considered a violation of Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.86 In
Pharmaceutical Care Management Assoc. v. Rowe, PBMs successfully
challenged their characterization as fiduciaries, arguing that Maine’s
UPDPA was preempted by ERISA.87 However, on appeal, the First

78
Glanton v. ALCOA Prescription Drug Plan, 465 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Kayes
v. Pac. Lumber, 51 F.3d 1449, 1458-61 (9th Cir. 1995)).
79
29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000); but see Karen Lee, Need for PBM Firewalls Comes Tumbling
Down, (Mar. 1, 2002), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_km2922/is_200203/ai_n
6927610/print.
80
29 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1105 (2000).
81
29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (2000).
82
Act to Protect Against Unfair Prescription Drug Practices, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 2699 (2005). The “covered entities” referred to are the PBM’s health plan provider
customers. Id. at (1)(A).
83
Id. at (2)(G). Accord 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/25 (West Supp. 2007) (providing
that PBMs must disclose any “conflict(s) of interest” with the state’s Medicaid program).
84
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2699(2)(D).
85
Id.
86
Id. at § 2699(4).
87
307 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D. Me. 2004) (holding that ERISA preempts Maine’s UPDPA). See
also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (stating that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”). See generally
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)
(“[w]here a State’s law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans . . . or where
the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation” ERISA supersedes the state
law); N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
658 (1995); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1990); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 462
U.S. 85, 98 (1983).
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Circuit held that Maine’s UPDPA did not “relate to” ERISA plans and
therefore was not preempted by ERISA.88
In addition to ERISA, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act89 (“HIPAA”) governs the use of protected health
information90 while providing for limited regulation of PBMs.91
Agreements between “covered entities,” such as health plans and other
organizations that provide services to the covered entity, are required to
assure the confidentiality and protection of the private health
information.92
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) also provides a basis for targeting
PBMs practices that may be fraudulent.93 The liability of PBMs under
the FCA can be direct liability or indirect liability.94 PBMs can also have
liability under the Medicaid rebate program, in that the PBM may
overstate the price offered to it by the manufacturer if the PBM fails to
take into account “certain payments for benefits provided to PBMs by
the pharmaceutical manufacturers. . . .“95 The FCA, while useful in
regulating the PBM industry, is not co-extensive with the industry’s
business. Individuals who are health plan participants are generally not
beneficiaries under Medicare or Medicaid.96 Because no claim is made to
the government in such cases, the FCA would not apply. The ability of

Pharm. Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305 (1st Cir. 2005).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000) (requiring a written contract between a health plan or other
covered entity and the service provider).
90
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2000) (defining protected health information as any
information that can be linked to a particular individual).
91
Id.
92
See The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1997). See generally Steven D. Morgan, Implementing the HIPAA
Transaction Standards in Managed Care Pharmacy Settings, 16:1 HEALTH L. 14 (Nov. 2003).
93
See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000) (prohibiting knowingly presenting a
false or fraudulent claim for payment to the government, a prohibition that applies to a
large number of PBM transactions, if not to all of them following the enactment of a
Medicare prescription drug benefit by Congress).
94
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729. Liability under the FCA extends to those who submit false claims
or cause false claims to be submitted. This broad coverage of the FCA includes those who
submit a claim to another, who then submits a false claim. See, e.g., U.S. of America ex rel.
A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 447 (6th Cir. 2005)
(interpreting the FCA); U.S. of America ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (same); U.S. of America ex rel. Sarasola v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1292,
1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (same).
95
James G. Sheehan, Prescription Drug Plans, Fraud Schemes, and the False Claims Act, 17
TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD 18, 21 (1999).
96
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2000) (the False Claims Act does contain qui tam
provisions).
88
89
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the FCA to limit behavior by the PBM is therefore limited to situations
where the government has been defrauded.
Even the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(“RICO”)97 provides a statutory basis for attacking PBM practices.98 In
Morse v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,99 plaintiffs brought a RICO claim
against a PBM. The judge allowed a multi-count fraud action to proceed
against several defendants, including a PBM.100
In 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act (“MMA”).101 The MMA created
Medicare Part D, which provides for a prescription drug benefit for
Medicare Part A and Part B recipients. Prescription drug plans (“PDPs”)
offered as part of the MMA must provide beneficiaries with an adequate
retail network as well as information about out-of-area coverage.
Formularies and drug utilization reviews used in or conducted by these
PDPs must meet the requirements set forth under the MMA. PBMs are
regulated by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”)
under the MMA. CMS is a federal agency within the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services that is responsible for administering
Medicare and working with the states to administer state Medicaid
programs. CMS regulates the PBM industry under the MMA by
establishing regulations regarding rebates, discounts, formularies, mail
order, reporting, dispensing fees, and networks.102 CMS also has the
right to review marketing materials prepared under Medicare Part D.103
Thus, the MMA (through CMS) regulates the activities of the PBMs that
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000). RICO makes it unlawful “for any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. “Racketeering activity”
includes, among other offenses, wire and mail fraud. Id.; see also Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d
428, 441 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that, a plaintiff must plead under RICO’s § 1962(c) the
following elements: “(1) conduct; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of
racketeering activity”); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)
(holding that predicate acts must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury); Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 176 (1993) (holding that the “conduct” element “requires some
participation in the operation or management of the enterprise itself”); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (holding that the “enterprise” must be “a group of
persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct”).
99
No. 99 C 0193, 2000 WL 246245 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2000).
100
Id.
101
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, tit. XI, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
102
42 C.F.R. § 403.806 (2005); 42 C.F.R. § 423.562 (2005); 42 C.F.R. § 423.871 (2005).
103
42 C.F.R. § 423.50 (2005).
97
98
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are implementing the Prescription Drug Plans. Medicare, Medicaid,
SCHIP, and TriCare are all subject to anti-kickback regulations that
apply to PBMs.104
Additionally, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) published
draft regulations about advertising and other promotional practices by
PBMs in 1998. The FDA administers the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)105 and the regulations implementing it by
regulating labeling106 and promotional activities107 by manufacturers.
The FDA’s “Draft Guidance, therefore, tries to fit these relationships
between PBMs and manufacturers into the categories of labeling and
manufacturer promotion.”108 The FDA was concerned about the effects
of PBM promotional practices on patient health, as PBMs engage in
practices such as drug switching.
Other federal agencies also provide some level of oversight. For
example, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health
and Human Services participates in the oversight of the PBM industry by
issuing compliance guides109 and providing certain types of safe harbors
relating to prescriptions.110 In addition, the Department of Justice
enforces the laws and regulations that apply to the PBM industry. It
does so by investigating allegations of wrongdoing, negotiating consent
orders that relate to anti-kickback laws under Medicare, Medicaid, and
TriCare, the military’s benefit plan.
Further, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) provides some
oversight of the PBM industry through regulation of business
combinations within the industry, its implementation of the regulations

104
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b). The terms “kickback” and “bribe” are not defined in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b.
105
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301 (2000).
106
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) (2000) (stating that labeling “disseminated by or on behalf” of
the manufacturer constitutes labeling for the purposes of the Act).
107
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(k) (defining regulated advertisements as those “issued or caused to
be issued” by the manufacturer).
108
Johnson, supra note 5, at 337 (quoting James G. Sheehan, Fraud and Abuse in the
Marketing of Ethical Pharmaceuticals Through Pharmacy Benefit Management Programs, 15 FOOD
DRUG COSM. & MED. DEVICE L. DIG. 49, 52 (1998)).
109
67 Fed. Reg. 62057-03 (Oct. 3, 2002).
See generally, OIG Pharma Guidelines
haveImplications for PBMs, Payers, (July 11, 2003), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_m0NKV/is_7_4/ai_105645099.
110
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952.
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regarding antirust conspiracies,111 and its implementation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of
competition”112 and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”113 The FTC
administers the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, which requires pre-merger
notification to the FTC.114 Also, the FTC issues regulations and guidance
to the PBM industry in the area of consumer advertising.115
Finally, federal antitrust laws apply to PBMs, just as to other entities.
Antitrust claims have been brought under section 16 of the Clayton
Act116 which allows “[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association” to
seek injunctive relief against threatened loss or “damage by a violation of
the antitrust laws . . .”117 and under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade.”118
B. State Regulation of PBMs
State oversight of PBMs falls under the aegis of several state
agencies.
These include boards of pharmacy, state insurance
commissioners, and state Medicaid agencies. State boards of pharmacy
regulate PBMs only to the extent that the PBM operates a mail order or
internet fulfillment facility in the state.119 In these states, the PBM is
111
Ruth Barber Timm, The Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine and the Pharmaceutical Benefit
Management Industry: A Proposed Exception to the Copperweld Holding, 31 VAL. U. L. REV.
309 (1996).
112
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000) (prohibiting “unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. . . .”).
113
Id.
114
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Pub.L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390 (1976). The Hart-ScottRodino Act lays out a three-part test for pre-merger notification to the FTC. Id.
115
See Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Request for Comments on
Agency Draft Guidance Documents Regarding Consumer-Directed Promotion, Public Hearing
Dkt. No. 2004D-0042, Comments Before the Dept. of Health & Human Serv. Food & Drug
Admin. (May 10, 2004).
116
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2000).
117
Id.
118
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). See also NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133 (1998)
(holding that to be violative of this provision, the action must unreasonably restrain trade);
U.S. v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (holding that price fixing has been
held to be a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act); U. S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (same); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 489 (1977); Eichorn v. AT&T, 248 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that even if the
actions complained of are per se illegal, the plaintiff must still allege and prove an antitrust
injury).
119
See NCPA Model Bill, Pharmacy Benefit Manager Licensure and Solvency Protection Act,
http://www.nlarx.com/modelleg/pdfs/NCPA-PBMbill.pdf. The National Community
Pharmacists Association (“NCPA”), the industry organization that represents independent
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regulated like any other retail or mail order pharmacy facility. Some
states regulate claims processing performed by PBMs.120 State Medicaid
agencies also regulate claims processing and drug utilization review
services by the PBMs.121 Finally, states may regulate the activities of
PBMs through their consumer protection laws, such as unfair
competition laws and consumer fraud laws.122 For example, many states
have antitrust laws based on the Uniform State Antitrust Act.123 States
may also have their own versions of anti-kickback laws. These laws
prohibit pharmacists from accepting payments for referrals or to
promote the sales of goods or services.
The National Association of Health Insurance Commissioners’s
(“NAIC”) Health Insurance and Managed Care Committee created the
Pharmaceutical Issues Working Group to consider state-level and other
regulation of PBMs. The NAIC drafted model legislation on prescription
drug benefit management activities. The ability of NAIC members to
pharmacies, has developed model legislation providing for state boards of pharmacy and
insurance commissioners to monitor the activities and financial stability of PBMS. Id. The
NCPA believes that PBMs are practicing pharmacy and should, therefore, be regulated as
pharmacies. Id. The NCPA’s model bill provides for a license specifically for PBMs. Id.
120
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6131 (West 2005).
121
See 42 C.F.R. § 456.722(a) (2000). The regulation states:
Each Medicaid agency, at its option, may establish, as its principal (but
not necessarily exclusive) means of processing claims for covered
outpatient drugs, a point-of-sale electronic claims management (ECM)
system to perform on-line, real-time (that is, immediate) eligibility
verifications, claims data capture, adjudication of claims, and to assist
pharmacists and other authorized persons (including dispensing
physicians) in applying for and receiving payment.
Id. The regulations go on to set minimum systems functional requirements. Id. at
456.722(b) & (c).
122
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521 (2007); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 Ch. 2A (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 6 § § 2511, 2531 (2007);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §501.201 (2007); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 504/1 (West 1998); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 714.16 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1410, 15:1410 (2007); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. Tit. 5, §205-A (2007); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. § 13-101 (West 2007); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. Ch. 93A, §1 (West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.0903 (West 2007); N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349-350, 63(12) (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-1.1 (West
2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.605-646.656 (West, 2007); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-1
(West 2007); TEX. BS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47 (Vernon 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2451
(West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-196 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.010
(West 2007).
123
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1401 (2007); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 Ch. 2A (2007); D.C. CODE § 28-4501 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §542.15 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50101 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:121 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 205-A (2007);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 93A, § 1 (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.771 (West
2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-1 (West 2007); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340 (McKinney 2007);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 133.01 (West 2007).
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affect the regulation of PBMs is limited, however, because state
insurance commissioners may only regulate health insurers. Arguably,
unless a health plan is capitated, the PBM is not providing health
insurance.124 For these reasons, state insurance commissioners have only
a limited ability to influence the activities of PBMs.
In addition, to the extent that a PBM assumes some of the risk
associated with a particular pharmacy plan, state departments of
insurance may regulate the entity.125 PBMs may also be regulated by
state departments of insurance depending on the structure of the
pharmacy plans the PBMs design for their health plan clients. In some
instances, PBMs may charge a flat fee or a fee per covered life, agreeing
to assume the risk that the actual pharmaceutical expenses will exceed
this fee. The contract between the health plan and the PBM might also
be negotiated to require that a portion of the PBM’s fee is placed “at risk”
and depends on the PBM’s performance. For example, AdvancePCS
describes its rebate guarantees as follows:
Agreements with certain health plan sponsor customers
contain provisions that require us to obtain a minimum
rebate per claim from pharmaceutical manufacturers in
order to generate additional savings for health plan
sponsor customers. Failure to achieve the minimum
rebate per claim results in an obligation by us to the
health plan sponsor customer.
The obligation is
equivalent to the difference between the actual rebate
per claim obtained and the minimum stated in the
health plan sponsor customer agreement, which is then
multiplied by the number of claims processed in a
specified period. We continually monitor the health
plan sponsor customers’ rebate per claim and recognize

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 176D, §3B (West 2007) (enacting “any willing provider”
statutes that apply to pharmacy networks, as well as other types of networks). See,
generally Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352, 363 (6th Cir. 2000), aff’d
sub nom. Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) (holding that an “any
willing provider” law did not violate ERISA’s preemption of state laws).
125
See State Insurance Commissioners Weigh PBM Regulations This Month, MANAGED CARE
MAG. (Mar. 2000), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0003/0003.states.html.
PBMs sometimes enter into capitated agreements with health plans under which the PBM
charges a fixed, or capitated, fee for all covered lives. Id. Under this type of arrangement,
the PBM assumes the risk of losses in excess of amounts charged. Id. When PBMs enter
into capitated agreement, they may become subject to regulation by the state’s insurance
commission. Id.
124
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a liability when it appears unlikely the average rebate
per claim will meet or exceed the stated minimum.126
Existing agencies and state regulations have been insufficient to
address the issues identified in Part IV of this article. For these reasons,
several states have proposed new legislation that specifically targets
PBMs. PBMs have fought against these proposed disclosure statutes,
which have often been supported by retail pharmacies.127
Thus, some states have considered, but not yet adopted, legislation
patterned on the NCPA’s model bill.128 In several other instances,
statutes regulating at least some of the PBMs’ business practices or
requiring the licensure within the state have been considered.129
The District of Columbia also passed a law to regulate PBMs.130 The
Access Rx Act, as it is known, requires PBMs to act as fiduciaries, to
notify health plans of any conflicts of interest, to pay over all payments
or rebates received from drug manufacturers, and to disclose all financial
terms with manufacturers upon request.131 That Act is now in litigation
and its effective date has been suspended by a court injunction. The
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association sued the District of
Columbia and was granted injunctive relief because the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia found that plaintiffs would
suffer irreparable harm if the District of Columbia was allowed to
enforce the Act.132 The plaintiff specifically challenged those portions of
the act that imposed fiduciary duties on PBMs133 and required them to
126
Advance PCS, Annual Report (Form 10-Q), at 54 (Aug. 13, 2003), http://sec.edgaronline.com/2003/08/13/0001193125-03-036190/Sectin9.asp.
127
Rob Eder, Nothing More ‘transparent’ than PBM Posturing—Prescription Benefit
Management, DRUG STORE NEWS (Sept 22, 2003), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_m3374/is-12-25/ai_108969842/print.
128
See, e.g., H.B. 493, 421st Leg. (Md. 2006); H. File 1989, 84th Leg. (Minn. 2005); H.B. 1374
(N.C. 2005); H.B. 714 (Pa. 2005); S.B. 828 (S.C. 2005).
129
See, e.g., H.B. 171 (Ala. 2006); S.B. 483, 580 (Conn. 2006); H.B. 516 (Del. 2006); H.B. 31 &
S.B. 1440 (Haw. 2005); S.B. 2799 (Ill. 2006); H.B. 160 & S.B. 181 (Iowa 2005); H.B. 5442 & S.B.
2697 (Miss. 2006); S.B. 2697 (Miss. 2006); H.B. 1247 N.H. 2006); S.B. 1291 (N.J. 2006); S.J.
Memorial 22, 47th Leg. (N.M. 2006); H.B. 2392 (Okla. 2006); S.B. 2247 (R.I. 2006); S.B. 2847 &
H.B. 2971 (Tenn. 2006); SB. 261 (Vt. 2006); H.B. 945, 2473 (Va. 2006); H. Con. Res. 81, 78th
Leg. (W. Va. 2006).
130
D.C. CODE § 48-831.01 (2001) et seq.
131
Id.
132
Memorandum Opinion Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief (Dec. 21,
2004), Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. The District of Columbia, CV 04-1082 (D.D.C.).
The plaintiff argued that the Act was preempted by ERISA and that the Act violated the
Takings and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. Id.
133
D.C. CODE § 48-832.01 (2001).
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make certain financial disclosures.134 The Access Rx Act also regulates
PBMs’ drug switching practices.135
Additionally, Georgia passed legislation in 2002 that requires
licensure of PBMs as pharmacies and allows for inspection of PBM
premises, whether located in Georgia or elsewhere.136 In 2006, Georgia
passed another law that provides for audit rights by third party payors
dealing with PBMs.137
Numerous other states have passed statutes regulating PBMs,
including Kansas, which passed legislation in 2006 that requires PBMs to
register with the state’s insurance commissioner.138 Also, Maryland
passed a law in 2003 that requires the State’s Insurance Department to
examine PBMs at least triennially.139 Louisiana also regulates PBMs as a
third party administrator under state insurance regulations.140 Similarly,
Mississippi has subjected PBMs to some oversight by the state Insurance
Department. Mississippi’s Pharmacy Benefit Prompt Pay Act, passed in
2006, requires PBMs to file financial statements with the state Insurance
Department, use nationally recognized pricing databases, and pay claims
within fifteen days.141 North Dakota requires that PBMs register as an
administrator with that state’s insurance department, disclose ownership
of the PBM, comply with certain requirements regarding drug
substitution, offer to health plans a transaction fee without sharing
payments received from drug manufacturers, and allow health plans to
audit the PBM’s books.142 Rhode Island also requires PBMs to register as
third party administrators and to file annual reports with the state
insurance commissioner that includes a complete description of all
financial arrangements between the PBM and other entities, such as drug
manufacturers.143 Additionally, South Dakota requires registration of
the PBM as a third party administrator, requires the PBM to perform its
duties in the exercise of good faith and fair dealing, requires the PBM to

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at § 48-832.01(c)(1)(A).
Id. at § 48-832.01(d).
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4-110.1 (West 2007).
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4-118 (West 2007).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3821 (2006).
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10B-20 (2007).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:3031 (2007).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-21-126 (2007).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-27-02-07 (2007).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-29.1 (2007).
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disclose rebate and other revenues, and gives the health plan audit
rights.144
Finally, Maine passed a law regulating PBMs in June of 2003.145 The
Maine law provides that PBMs are fiduciaries and must act “with care,
skill, prudence and diligence and in accordance with the standards of
conduct applicable to a fiduciary in an enterprise of like character and
with like aims.”146 Under the statute, the PBM must provide all financial
information requested by the health plan and must transfer to the plan
any payments received from drug manufacturers for drug
substitutions.147
In September of 2004, the PBM industry group, the PCMA, filed suit
in the United States District Court in Maine seeking to enjoin the law on
the basis of ERISA preemption. The PBM industry argued before the
law’s passage that it would destroy the competitive market for drugs,
compromise PBM trade secrets, conflict with ERISA and FEHBA, violate
the takings and due process clauses of the United States and state
constitutions,148 and would have allowed unfettered enforcement under
state unfair trade practices acts.149 Maine’s law, like that of the District of
Columbia, would have characterized PBMs as fiduciaries. As a
fiduciary, the PBM would have disclosure obligations and would be
prohibited from self-dealing. PBMs have fought characterization as
fiduciaries in the past.150 When PBMs negotiate with health plans they
typically insist on a provision that specifically states that they are not
plan fiduciaries, though the contract language is not dispositive of the
issue. Maine’s law was an example of legislators’ attempt to divide and
conquer. The law would have grandfathered and exempted some PBMs,
while others would have been subject to all of the law’s provisions.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-29E (2007).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2699 (2007).
146
Id. at § 2699(2)(A).
147
Id. at § 2699(2)(D).
148
See Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. Rowe, 307 F. Supp. 2d 164, 178-79 (D. Me.
2004), aff’d 429 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2360 (2006) (finding that
mandatory disclosure requirements under Maine’s UPDPA could destroy the value of the
PBMs’ trade secrets); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984); see also
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that the
protection afforded by the Takings Clause includes protection of intangible property, such
as trade secrets).
149
Milt Freudenheim & Robert Pear, More Disclosure for Drug Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2003.
150
See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2000).
144
145
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In addition to passing legislation to rein in PBMs, states can affect
PBMs through their own contracting processes.151 When a state sends a
request for proposals (“RFP”) to the various PBMs, the state can require
the PBMs to promise a degree of pricing transparency, reporting, and
audit rights. When the low-cost PBM is selected, the state’s contract with
that PBM should include the pricing and reporting provisions necessary
to assure appropriate pricing, transparency, and audit rights.
IV. IMPACT OF THE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND INADEQUATE
REGULATION
The PBMs are the common counterparty with health plans, retail
pharmacies, and drug manufacturers. Thus, no single entity of these
entities knows the economics of the transactions with the other
counterparties. This lack of transparency has created an environment in
which PBMs may engage in practices that involve self-dealing or that are
prohibited under various laws. Examples of these practices include drug
switching, channeling certain prescriptions to the PBMs’ own mail order
or specialty pharmacies, and certain rebate and pricing practices. The
PBMs, which are ostensibly hired by health plans as the agents for those
plans to negotiate with manufacturers and retail pharmacies, hide from
their own clients what they pay for prescriptions and often fail to
disclose appropriate information regarding rebates.152 One industry
expert who has studied PBMs for years stated:
What seems clear from this navigation of the PBM maze
is that prescription benefit plan sponsors (either private
employers or government entities) should insist on full
disclosure of cash flows to and through the PBM that is
administering their drug benefit. Without this level of
scrutiny, the plan sponsor cannot be sure if its PBM is
providing a good service for a fair price or is acting
primarily in its own interest.153

151
See generally Kimberley Fox et al., State Pharmacy Discount Programs: A Viable
Mechanism for Addressing Prescription Drug Affordability?, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187
(2004).
152
Davis, supra note 9. (“[T]he giant PBMs continue to hide plenty from their own clients
in the name of competition. Many PBMs refuse to show exactly what they pay for
prescriptions because, they say, manufacturers—and not customers—would benefit from
such knowledge.”).
153
Robert I. Garis et al., Examining the Value of Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies,
AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACISTS, 81, 85 (2004).
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The PBM industry argues that legislation mandating disclosure will
harm the PBM industry and reduce the discounts that the PBMs are able
to negotiate on behalf of health plans. This argument is based on a study
performed on behalf of the Pharmaceutical Care Management
Association by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, stating that disclosure of this
type “is not required of other healthcare organizations. In a competitive
environment, the ability to negotiate in confidentiality is paramount.
Without such confidentiality, competition, and the benefits derived from
it, is eroded. Those benefits include lower costs achieved through a
competitive model.”154
Yet, this argument is contradicted by South Dakota’s recent
experience. As noted previously, in 2004, South Dakota passed
transparency legislation of the type opposed by the PCMA.155 Despite
the passage of the legislation, pharmacy prices in South Dakota appear
to be no higher than prices elsewhere. In addition, although PBMs
fought the legislation by arguing that they would be forced to leave
South Dakota, none have done so since the legislation’s enactment.
PBMs are concerned that transparency legislation would require the
public disclosure of information such as: (1) agreements with
manufacturers regarding rebates, discounts, and incentives; (2)
agreements favoring one manufacturer’s product over another; (3)
agreements regarding whether a product will be placed on (or removed
from) a formulary list; and (4) agreements regarding how much the PBM
bills the client or reimburses the pharmacy.156 In other words, if
transparency legislation were passed, the PBMs would be forced to
compete on the basis of price, rather than on the basis of obfuscation.
The PBMs argue the manufacturers and retail pharmacies would be less
willing to negotiate aggressively with PBMs if they knew that the
agreement would be made public.157
David Balto, former policy director
Commission’s Bureau of Competition, has
arguments “are inconsistent with economic
common sense . . . . To the contrary, greater

for the Federal Trade
observed that these PBM
theory, antitrust law and
transparency will enhance

The Value of Pharmacy Benefit Management and the National Cost Impact of Proposed PBM
Legislation, at 16 (July 2004).
155
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-29E (2007).
156
The Value of Pharmacy Benefit Management and the National Cost Impact of Proposed PBM
Legislation, at 16 (July 2004).
157
Id. at 17.
154
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competition and lower prices.”158 Economists generally agree that
transparent pricing ensures survival of the best firms and will result in
lower prices as the firms compete with each other for market share.159
An antitrust attorney recently characterized PBMs as having an
oligopoly and contended that it is “patently absurd” to assume that
manufacturers would stop offering rebates if transparency were
increased.160 Arguably, the market power that PBMs wield stems both
from market share and also from the paucity of information available to
those who deal with the PBMs.161
Transparency can be especially important in controlling costs in the
healthcare arena, as has been demonstrated in other fields. For example,
in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,162 the Supreme Court found that a
conspiracy among dentists to refuse to provide x-rays to managed care
providers suppressed competition.163 Where a third party, even a
buying consortium, acts as an intermediary between willing buyers and

See Eder, supra note 127.
Jack Guynn, President & CEO, Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Keynote Address at the
Carter Center Conference on “Transparency for Growth in the Americas” (May 4, 1999):
[T]he benefits of transparency . . . far outweigh the costs; that in the
long run all of these things lead to greater economic growth and
stability; and that the benefits ultimately accrue to the individual and
society as a whole. . . . [I]n a market for goods in which quality varies
and in which the seller has more information about the quality of the
goods being offered than the buyer, good products and bad products
must sell at the same price. When buyers have no way to distinguish
between products — when they are forced to assume the worst — the
market price tends to be the lemon price, and good sellers eventually
leave the market. Thus do bad cars, bad money — bad whatever —
drive out the good.
158
159

“The purchaser’s problem . . . is to identify quality.” [Professor]
Akerlof said, “There may be potential buyers of good quality
products and there may be potential sellers of such products in the
appropriate price range; however, the presence of people who wish to
pawn bad wares as good wares tends to drive out the legitimate
business. The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the
amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include
the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence.”
Id.
See Eder, supra note 127.
See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377-78 (1977) (noting that restrictions
on pricing transparency “increase the difficulty of discovering the lowest cost seller” and
“perpetuate the market position of established” sellers); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 431 (2000).
162
476 U.S. 447 (1986).
163
Id. at 454-55.
160
161
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sellers dealing on an arm’s length basis, this can constrain the buyers and
sellers from independently reaching an appropriate price.164
Aside from the economic argument regarding the pricing impact of
non-transparent business practices, there have been several suggestions,
primarily in litigation against the PBMs, that these entities engage in a
number of illegal business practices. These include drug switching,165
channeling prescriptions to entities owned by the PBMs, and various
other rebate and pricing schemes. A number of lawsuits have been
brought around the country against the PBMs for these practices.
A. Drug Product Switching
The business model used by PBMs allows them to engage in drug
product switching, which occurs when a prescription is switched from
one drug to another that has similar therapeutic characteristics and will
not change the patient’s health outcome differently than the first drug.
Switching can occur because of the influence PBMs exercise on doctors166

164
Kartell v. BCBS of Mass., 749 F.2d 922, 924 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that Blue Cross
intervened in the market to keep buyers and sellers from reaching arm’s length agreements
on pricing and service); see also Austin v. BCBS of Ala., 903 F.2d 1385, 1391 (11th Cir. 1990).
In Austin, the court noted that where the purchaser sets pricing, it may be predatory
pricing. Id. The issue identified by the Austin court was “whether, standing alone, Blue
Cross’ use of its market power to gain lower rates for its subscribers from hospitals
violate[d] the Sherman Act.” Id. at 1390. The Austin court looked to Travelers Insurance
Company v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093
(1973), in which the Third Circuit stated:
In its negotiating with hospitals, Blue Cross has done no more than
conduct its business as every rational enterprise does, i.e., get the best
deal possible. This pressure encourages hospitals to keep their costs
down; and, for its own competitive advantage, Blue Cross passes along
the saving thus realized to consumers. To be sure, Blue Cross’ initiative
makes life harder for commercial competitors such as Travelers. The
antitrust laws, however, protect competition, not competitors; and stiff
competition is encouraged, not condemned.
Id. at 84.
165
Milt Freudenheim, Medco to Pay $29.3 Million to Settle Claims of Drug Switching, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27 2004 at C1.
166
Victoria Stagg Elliott, Physicians Say No to Automatic Therapeutic Drug Substitutions, 44
AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 8, 2001, http://www.ama-assn.org/amendnews/2001-0101h1120101.htm; cf. AM. MEDICAL ASSOC., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 8 (2006-2007) (stating
that physicians must not allow their professional judgment to be influenced by
inappropriate outside persuasion); American Medical Association Opinion E-8.06,
Prescribing and Dispensing Drugs and Devices, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/8483.html (same).
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and individual consumers through advertising167 and through the PBM’s
disease management businesses.168 Some scholars have written about
the practice of switching169 as a possible violation of the anti-kickback
law.170
The states have been active in suing PBMs to curb perceived pricing
abuses and to recover for past abuses. For example, in April of 2004,
attorneys general from twenty states settled claims under state deceptive
trade practices laws against Medco Health Solutions, Inc.171 The
complaint alleged unfair trade practices and that Medco encouraged
therapeutic switching, or switching patients from a lower cost or generic
drug to a brand name drug to allow the PBM to earn higher rebates or
incentive payments. According to the lawsuit, Medco did not pass its
savings from therapeutic switching on to patients or health plan
sponsors. Eliot Spitzer, in response, stated: “This case shows how
[PBMs] previously hid from consumers, doctors and health plans that
they were switching prescriptions to promote their own profits.”172
Health plans are concerned about drug switching because, although the
drugs may address the same condition, a switch from one drug to
another often requires follow-up testing and office visits, all of which
come at a cost to the plan.
The suit settled in April 2004, with Medco agreeing to pay $20.2
million to the states, $6.6 million in fees and costs, and $2.5 million to
patients.173 The Consent and Stipulation entered into by Medco prohibits

PR Mansfield et al., Direct to Consumer Advertising is at the Crossroads of Competing
Pressures from Industry and Health Needs, BRITISH MEDICAL J. 330:5-6 (Jan. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.chspr.ubc.ca/node/116.
168
Bruce Ingersoll, Drugs: FDA to Watch Drug Switching, Sales Practices, WALL ST. J., JAN.
6, 1998, at B1 (stating that the idea behind disease management programs is that noncompliance with prescription drug regimes is likely to result in higher costs to the health
plan because lack of compliance can lead to emergency room visits or hospital stays).
169
See Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care
Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 467-74 (1988); see also Learn, supra note 57, at 249;
Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Courtesies or Cost-Effectiveness?:
Application of the Medicare Anti-kickback Law to the Marketing and Promotional Practices of Drug
and Medical Device Manufacturers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 279, 309 (1999).
170
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (defining “remuneration” as “including any kickback, bribe or
rebate”).
171
See Press Release, New York Attorney General, 19 States Settle Deceptive Trade Practices
Claims Against Medco Health Solutions (Apr. 26, 2004), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/
2004/apr/apr26b_04.html.
172
Id.
173
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The United States Settles Its Anti-Fraud Claims for
Injunctive Relief and 20 State Attorneys General Settle Unfair Trade Practices Claims Against
167
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the company from soliciting drug switches in situations where the PBM
benefits at the expense of these other parties. Medco also agreed to take
certain prospective steps, such as disclosing to prescribers and patients
any financial incentives Medco has for drug switching.174 In addition,
Medco must comply with certain forward-looking disclosure obligations,
must establish processes to obtain express permission to switch drugs,
must monitor the health effects of drug switches, and must adopt the
code of ethics of the American Pharmacists Association.175
The Prescription Access Litigation Project, the American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees, and the AFL-CIO filed
another significant lawsuit in 2003 against Advance PCS, Express Scripts,
Medco Health Solutions, and Caremark.176 The plaintiffs alleged that the
PBMs negotiated lower prices with drug manufacturers, but failed to
pass those cost savings on to the plans they represented, artificially
inflating prices.177 According to the President of AFSCME, “It’s
corporate greed like this that is chipping away at the paychecks of hard
working men and women across the country.”178
B. Channeling Prescriptions to PBM-Owned Businesses
The use of mail order as a prescription fulfillment channel has
increased in the past few years and litigation relating to mail order
fulfillment by PBMs is likely to increase in the near future.179 For health
plan participants, mail order provides convenience and can also provide
for a lower copay, as the copay for a ninety-day supply of drugs will
generally be less than the copays for three thirty-day supplies. Concerns
about mail order fulfillment exist largely because the major PBMs
operate their own mail order facilities, giving them an additional
opportunity to profit from transactions by health plan participants.
Medco Health Solutions (Apr. 26, 2004), http://www.us doj.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2004/
apr/medcoinjunctivereliefrelease.pdf.
174
Id.
175
American Pharmacists Association, Code of Ethics for Pharmacists (adopted Oct. 27,
1994), http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=2654&
TEMPLATE=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm.
176
AFSCME v. AdvancePCS, No. BC 292227 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty. Apr. 4,
2003).
177
Id.
178
Press Release, AFSCME, Pharmacy Benefit Managers Charged with Inflating Prescription
Drug Prices Lawsuit Alleges Secret Deals between PBMs & Pharmaceutical Companies (Mar. 18,
2003), http://www.badfaithinsurance.org/reference/LMCOPBM/0010a.htm.
179
Judith A. Waltz, Multimillion Dollar Settlement Signals Government’s Increased Scrutiny of
Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 DRUG BENEFIT TRENDS 15, 15-16 (2001), http://www.medscape.
com/viewarticle/414901.
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Fulfillment through mail order facilities operated by the PBMs can
increase costs to health plans in several ways. First, generic dispensing
in PBM-owned facilities is increasing and mail tends to employ higher
spreads on generic drugs than retail pharmacy dispensing.180 The
enhanced generic spread in mail order fulfillment comes in addition to
the rebates PBMs receive for brand drug dispensing. Second, PBMs may
channel patients toward higher-priced drugs through switching. The
mail order facility has a call center whose task is to contact physicians
and switch patients to the “preferred” (rebatable) drugs. Third, they
may also fulfill prescriptions for high-priced specialty pharmaceuticals
themselves. Fourth, they may channel prescriptions through their own
fulfillment facility, rather than to the facility that can fill the prescription
the most inexpensively. Fifth, they charge the plan for processing the
transaction, both as a PBM and as a fulfiller. Sixth, waste is higher for
mail order fulfillment because plan sponsors pay for a ninety-day supply
of a prescription that may or may not work for a particular participant.181
If the prescription does not work, the participant must then have another
prescription filled.
A study that was funded by retail pharmacies noted that PBMs
might steer participants to higher priced drugs on which the PBMs earn
higher rebates.182 For example, a mail order facility may be less inclined
to channel a participant toward a generic drug, when the PBM that owns
the mail order facility makes more in rebates on the brand name drug.
Another area of increased profits relating to PBM mail order practices

180
Press Release, Caremark Rx, Inc., Caremark Rx, Inc. Reports Second Quarter 2006
Earnings: Company Raises Full Year 2006 Earnings Guidance (Aug. 8 2006), http://sec.edgaronline.com/2006/08/08/0001193125-06-164865/Section2.asp (stating “Mail pharmacy
revenues increased 11% to $3.2 billion and mail pharmacy claims were 15.2 million, up 5%
from the second quarter of 2005.”); Press Release, Express Scripts, Inc., 9.5 Million Shares
Repurchased During the Quarter (July 26, 2006), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.
zhtml?c=69641&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=888008&highlight= (“As a result of the success of
our formulary strategy, and strong underlying trends for continued growth in generic
utilization, specialty pharmacy and home delivery, we are raising our 2006 earnings
guidance.”); Press Release, Medco Health Solutions, Inc., Medco Reports Second-Quarter 2006
GAAP Earnings of $0.56 per Share (Aug. 4, 2006), http://www.alacrastore.com/
storecontent/newstex/PRN-000510024901 (“The sequential increase in EBITDA per
adjusted prescription was driven primarily by an 80 basis point increase in the generic
dispensing rate at mail, an increase in adjusted mail penetration, and stronger Accredo
Health Group margins.”).
181
Norman V. Carroll et. al., Comparison of Costs of Community and Mail Service Pharmacy,
45 J. AM. PHARM. ASSOC. 336, 336-43 (2005) (“The available evidence suggests that the
wastage rate for mail service pharmacies is about two times greater than that for
community pharmacies.”).
182
Langenfeld, supra note 21.
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would be inflation of AWP by use of relabeled drugs, although this is
less prevalent today than it was a few years ago. Another concern is
whether the PBMs allow for a three-month prescription to be filled only
at their own mail order facilities.183
Because of the concerns about the potential for self-dealing in cases
where the PBM owns a mail order facility, Congress required the Federal
Trade Commission to study these issues. This “Conflict of Interest
Study” reviewed whether there are cost differences between prescription
drugs dispensed by mail in PBM-owned mail order pharmacies and
those that are not owned by PBMs. The Federal Trade Commission’s
study was released in August of 2005.184
The study found a link between increases in prescription drug costs
and a PBM’s activities as both manager of a plan and operator of its own
mail order pharmacy.185 For example, generic substitution rates tended
to be higher when PBMs filled the prescriptions using mail order
pharmacies owned by others than when PBMs filled the prescriptions
using their own mail order pharmacies.186
Other reviews of the mail order industry have concluded, however,
that health plans’ mail order costs tend to be higher than their retail
costs.187 This is because the plan sponsor typically agrees to allow
participants to obtain a ninety-day supply for the equivalent of two copayments rather than three. This loss of a co-payment “has become a
major cost to health plans.”188 Although mail order fulfillment was less
expensive for health plan participants, “[f]rom the health plan’s
perspective, the loss of copayments in the mail service benefit was
greater than the savings on ingredient costs and dispensing fees.”189

183
10 Federal News, Antitrust Scrutiny Likely to Increase for PBM Mail-Order Arrangements,
Lawyers Say, No. 12 (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.badfiathinsurance.org/
reference/GMCOPBM/0043a.htm.
184
FTC, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Ownership of Mail-Order Pharmacies (Aug. 2005),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf.
185
See Langenfeld, supra note 21.
186
Id.
187
Bartholemew E. Clark et. al., Poster Presentation: Implications of Incentives Increasing
Mail-Service Pharmacy Utilization, Academy Health Annual Research Meeting (June 26-28,
2005), http://chpe.creighton.edu/chpe/snapshots/garis/Snapshot_Garis.pdf.
188
Carroll, supra note 181, at 336.
189
Id.
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C. Rebate and Pricing Schemes
Various lawsuits have alleged that PBMs perpetrate several types of
schemes, including schemes relating to rebates, formulary decisions,
mail order decisions, and spreads. For example, in In re Warfarin Sodium
Antitrust Litigation, a manufacturer of generic prescription drugs alleged
that the manufacturer of name-brand drugs had paid rebates to PBMs to
assure that the name brand rather than the generic oral anticoagulant
drug was prescribed.190 The district court refused to grant a motion to
dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff had stated a claim for commercial
bribery.191
In Mulder v. PCS Health Systems, Inc., the trial court certified a class
comprised of plans administered by PCS Health Systems. 192 The PBM
moved for summary judgment arguing that it was not a fiduciary for
purposes of ERISA.193 The district court agreed194 with the PBM’s
argument that claims processing, formulary establishment, rebate
processing, and drug utilization reviews did not render the PBM a plan
fiduciary under ERISA. The court noted that the concept of a fiduciary
under ERISA is elastic; an entity might meet the definition of fiduciary
for certain purposes, but not for others.195 The court then examined each
of the areas listed above to determine whether PCS was operating as a
fiduciary in performing those services.196 With respect to claims
processing, the court noted that other courts had held that processing
was sufficient to prove that an entity was operating as a fiduciary,197 but
distinguished those cases by noting that those entities also controlled the
related cash reserves while PCS did not control the reserves and did not
exercise discretionary authority.198 Regarding the role of the PBM in the
establishment of the formulary, the court held that the fiduciary duty
requirements of ERISA do not apply where the plan sponsor makes plan

214 F.3d 395 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id.
192
216 F.R.D. 307 (D.N.J. 2003) (certifying the class to pursue claims for kickbacks and
unlawful rebates, but limited the class to participants in plans that the same PBM
administered).
193
Id.
194
432 F. Supp. 2d 450 (D.N.J. 2006).
195
Id. at 454.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 456 (citing Sixty-Five Sec. Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 583 F. Supp. 380
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Greenblatt v. Prescription Plan Servs. Corp., 783 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
198
Id. (noting that merely following the terms of the plan document does not constitute
an exercise of discretionary authority).
190
191
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design decisions rather than the PBM.199 Similarly, with respect to rebate
services provided by PCS, the court stated, “PCS did not acquire
fiduciary status or have discretionary authority over plan assets simply
by contracting to receive its compensation for services through drug
manufacturer rebates.”200 This role in negotiating rebates on behalf of
the plan did not, in the court’s view, give PCS control or authority over
plan assets.201 And with respect to the drug utilization reviews provided
by PCS, it was the participants’ doctors who made the ultimate decisions
regarding which drugs to prescribe.202 Based on this analysis, the court
granted the PCS’s motion for summary judgment.203
Additionally, in Vermont, the State Auditor wrote to the Attorney
General requesting an investigation of Express Scripts, the PBM for state
government employees. She noted that Express Scripts “may be
pocketing hidden profits averaging 43 percent from certain drug
prescriptions.”204 The State Auditor’s office had performed sample
testing in July of 2004 and concluded that on some drugs, Express Scripts
was costing the state nearly $2 million per year by pocketing these
hidden profits.205
Further, in 2004, the U.S. government accused Medco of defrauding
federal customers by only partially filling, switching, or even destroying
their prescriptions.206 These practices violate the False Claims Act, which
prohibits billing for services that were not provided.207 Medco was also
alleged to have violated the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986208 by receiving
payment from drug manufacturers for favoring their drugs and by
paying a corporation to rely exclusively on Medco’s services.209 The two
Id. at 458.
Id. at 459-60.
201
Id. at 460.
202
Id. at 461.
203
Id.
204
Vermont May be Paying Hidden Drug Profits: Pharmacy Benefits Manager mark up drug
prices by as much as 111 Percent, THE GREEN MOUNTAIN EYESHADE (Office of the Vermont
State Auditor, Montpelier, VT) (Spring 2004), at 1.
205
Id.
206
U.S. v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C. and Medco Health Solutions, Inc., et. al.,
Nos. Civ.A.00-737, Civ.A.99-2332 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2004); David S. Cloud, US Targets PCS
and Merck-Medco in Investigation of Marketing Practices of Pharmaceutical Makers, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Mar. 8, 2000, at 28, available at 2000WL-WSJE 2947415; see also James G. Sheehan, Fraud
and Abuse in the Marketing of Ethical Pharmaceuticals Through Pharmacy Benefit Management
Programs, 15 FOOD DRUG COSM. & MED. DEVICE L. DIG. 49, 52 (1998).
207
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
208
41 U.S.C. § 51 (2000).
209
U.S. v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
199
200
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related cases were settled in October of 2006 for $155 million.210 In
addition to paying the fine, “the United States required that Medco enter
into a corporate compliance agreement with the Office of Inspector
General, Department of Health and Human Services; and with the Office
of Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management.”211
D. Anticompetitive and Deceptive Practices
In Alabama, North Jackson Pharmacy, a class plaintiff, filed suit
against Express Scripts and Medco Health Solutions, Inc., for violating
the Sherman Act in using “anticompetitive practices” against small retail
pharmacy operators.212 The plaintiffs alleged that the PBMs, acting as
middlemen, forced retail pharmacies to accept unconscionable
reimbursement rates.213 The judge denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, finding that the
complaint provided the defendants with fair notice of the nature of the
claims made against them.214
E. Kickbacks
In the Medco lawsuit filed by the U.S. government, the U.S. Attorney
alleged that Medco was engaged both in paying and accepting payments
in violation of anti-kickback laws.215 As noted above, Medco was
accused of violating the Public Contracts Anti-Kickback Act216 by
receiving payment from drug manufacturers for favoring their drugs
and by paying a corporation to rely exclusively on Medco’s services.217
The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and
Human Services announced in December of 2006 that it had entered into
an agreement under which Advance PCS would pay $137.4 million to
the government “and enter into a 5-year corporate integrity agreement to
resolve its liability for allegedly soliciting and receiving kickbacks from
pharmaceutical manufacturers and paying kickbacks to potential

210
Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Medco to Pay U.S. $155 Million to Settle False
Claims Act Cases (Oct. 23, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/06_civ_
722.html.
211
Id.
212
North Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Express Scripts, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2004).
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Katz, supra note 42.
216
41 U.S.C. § 51 (2000).
217
Merck-Medco, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
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customers to induce them to contract with the company. This settlement
represents the first of its kind with a PBM.”218
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Given the pervasiveness of issues with respect to PBMs, including
the lack of transparency, the complexity of industry audits, and the lack
of a meaningful regulatory scheme, other solutions should be explored.
Under a public sector approach, state agencies that contract with PBMs
in connection with Medicare and Medicaid could insist on transparency.
There are several private sector approaches that could assist health plans
in assuring that the terms of their agreements with their PBMs are the
best possible. Under a private sector approach, groups of several large
plans could cooperate to contract with a PBM of their choice, while
insisting on transparency. A single health plan or a single PBM could
also address these issues in unique ways. Standardized contracting has
also been suggested as an approach to these issues with PBMs.
As mentioned, a public sector approach would require state agencies
that contract with PBMs to insist on transparency as part of the
contracting process. Jeffrey Lewis, Executive Director of the Heinz
Family Philanthropies, has proposed this approach to achieve
transparency and lower prices in the drug-purchasing arena and agreed
to provide seed money to help states establish a public sector, non-profit
PBM.219 The Heinz Family Philanthropies worked with nine states and
the District of Columbia to create a nonprofit PBM to manage
prescription plans.220
The advantages and disadvantages of the Heinz approach were
discussed in a report by Health Policy and Payer Relations,221 which
noted: “For manufacturers, the non-profit PBM idea has pros and cons.
The upside is that a manufacturer will only have to negotiate with one

218
Office of Inspector General, OIG Reports More than $38 Billion in Savings and Recoveries
for FY 2006, OIG NEWS at 2 (Dec. 5, 2006), http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:_LD_
ArikPqwJ:oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/semiannual/2006/PRSemiannual%2520Final%2
520FY%25202006.pdf+OIG+kickback+PBM&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1).
219
Maine House Democrats, http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?
topic=housedems+news&id=1243&v=Article.
220
Milt Freudenheim, States Organizing a Nonprofit Group to Cut Drug Costs, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2003, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A06E1DC1231F937A
25752C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
221
Health Policy and Payer Relations, Issue Analysis: Medicaid PDLs and Supplemental
Rebate Restrictions (2003), http://www.parexelonpolicy.com/images/PAREXEL_Issue_
Analysis_PDLs.PDF.
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entity, instead of nine separate states. However, the existence of one
entity representing nine states, including two large ones, means that
negotiations are for higher stakes.”222 Although this approach was
suggested in 2002, and the coalition of states was formed in early 2003,
there has been little reported progress to date.
The first approach would be for a single employer to form its own
captive PBM. This approach would require the employer to have a
sufficient number of covered lives to interest drug manufacturers in
negotiating directly with it. The approach will work only where the
employer has several million covered lives, a number not even
approachable by Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest employer, with 1.3
million employees in the United States.223 Unfortunately, this approach
requires a level of expertise that far exceeds the in-house knowledge of
executives of even the largest benefits plans in the United States.224 A
second type of employer that might be able to use this approach is one
that has a large number of employees in one particular area. The
percentage of employees associated with the employer in the particular
area might be sufficient to move the market share in that market.
Another approach that a single employer could take is to change the
situs of its health plan to a state that mandates transparency.225 For
example, a law passed by South Dakota in 2004 requires each PBM to
“perform its duties exercising good faith and fair dealing toward the
covered entity”226 and to “disclose to the covered entity, the amount of
all rebate revenues and the nature, type, and amounts of all other
revenues that the pharmacy benefits manager receives from each
pharmaceutical manufacturer or labeler with whom the pharmacy
benefits manager has a contract.”227 One approach to the problem is for
health plans to transfer their situs to South Dakota or another state that
has favorable transparency and fiduciary duty legislation. This transfer

Id.
See http://www.walmartfacts.com (“Wal-Mart employs 1.8 million associates
worldwide, including 1.3 million in the United States.”) (last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
224
Katz, supra note 42. (“With all the criticism of pharmacy benefit managers, it’s fair to
ask whether they’re still needed at all. Handling drug benefits in house, however, is not in
the cards. ‘Somebody’s got to adjudicate the claims,’ says Ron Lyon, national pharmacy
practice leader with Towers Perrin, adding that PBMs do still provide substantial
discounts.”).
225
Act to Provide for the Regulation of Pharmacy Benefits Management, H.B. 1311, 79th
Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2004).
226
Id. at § 3.
227
Id. at § 4.
222
223
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would enable the plan to insist upon full disclosure under applicable
state laws.
Another private sector approach is for a PBM to develop a niche in
which it markets a completely transparent plan. Some small PBMs have
already begun to do so. According to the New York Times, “[s]ome
small benefit managers have begun selling ‘transparent’ drug plans,
promising to inform customers about all their dealings with
manufacturers, rather than base their business on a web of complex
rebates, discounts and incentive arrangements with drug makers.”228
Yet another approach is for a group of plans to work together to
form a non-profit PBM that provides complete transparency to plans. A
private sector approach to PBMs would require one or more private
employers to have the capability to process prescription transactions,
either directly or indirectly, through a third-party processor. The private
sector PBM would have to serve as an intermediary between the plans it
serves, retail pharmacies, and drug manufacturers. Perhaps the most
daunting aspect of this would be the creation of the system to handle the
transactions. The most likely source for the system would be an existing
small PBM that has already invested in the creation of a scalable system.
That PBM could be purchased through a joint venture arrangement
among the plans, the system could be licensed, or the plans could simply
pay a processing fee calculated on a per-covered life or per-transaction
basis. Some PBMs already exist that charge solely on a per-person or
per-transaction basis, with no other cash flow to the PBM. One example,
and probably the most experienced transparent PBM, is Pharmaceutical
Technologies, Inc./National Pharmaceutical Services, which has existed
since 1994. Other new PBMs that have adopted the transparent model
are Innoviant and Envision. All are full-service PBMs that provide
rebate contracting. These PBMs typically provide detailed rebate
accounting and may take a disclosed portion of the rebate (for example,
20-30%) as service fees.
Standardized contracting has been suggested as another way to
address the lack of transparency in the industry. A loose affiliation of
health plans calling itself the Rx Collaborative is administered by Towers
Perrin.229 Another, the Health Policy Association, is run by Hewitt

228
Milt Freudenheim & Robert Pear, More Disclosure for Drug Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2003, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E05E7D7113CF93AA25754C0A
9659C8B63&sec=health&spon=&pagewanted=print.
229
Katz, supra note 42. According to a recent article:
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Associates.230 This group originally approached manufacturers directly
to solicit pricing net of rebates.231 More than 50 Fortune 500 companies
in the group originally insisted on price transparency, including
complete disclosure of all PBM revenue sources and negotiating pricing
directly with the manufacturers.232 Yet, dispite the manufacturers’
general willingness to work with the plans, the administrative hurdles
associated with this approach proved insurmountable.233
Some large employers, members of the HR Policy Association, are
experimenting with the idea of a group purchasing arrangement.234
Group purchasing arrangements always carry antitrust concerns. The
Department of Justice has issued guidance to companies in the form of
Horizontal Merger Guidelines235 and Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care.236 The 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines discuss monopsonies (situations where a single buyer is able
“to depress the price paid for a product to a level that is below the

[T]he Rx Collaborative pledges that members will seek financial and
contractual protections in their drug-benefit agreements, according to a
Towers Perrin publication. Among them are price transparency via
“full disclosure” of PBM revenue sources; “100 percent pass-through
of rebates, discounts, and dispensing fees”; and enough information to
audit the PBM.
Id.
Id.
Why the Plans of a Major Drug Purchasing Coalition Did Not Work, DRUG BENEFIT NEWS
(Oct. 25, 2005), http://www.aishealth.com/DrugCosts/DBN_Drug_coalition_didn’t_work.
html.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Davis, supra note 9. Davis states:
The embattled pharmacy benefit management industry could soon
face competition from its own customers. For years, major employers
have simply trusted PBMs . . . [b]ut some big companies have grown
frustrated by the industry’s lack of transparency and have come to
doubt that the professed savings are real. Thus, dozens of companies
. . . have joined forces in an effort to directly negotiate with drug
manufacturers for discounts on their own. The HR Policy Association,
which formulated the idea, calls the group “the largest private-sector
drug purchasing coalition ever assembled.” . . . . The potential group
buyers have surfaced at a time when drug costs are soaring and PBMs
face intense government scrutiny for their pricing and business
practices.
Id. at 1.
235
U.S. Dept. of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992).
236
U.S. Dept. of Justice & FTC, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, at
54 (Aug. 1996); FTC & U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among
Competitors (Apr. 2000).
230
231
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competitive price and thereby depress output.”).237 Concerns regarding
development of monopsony power may exist if several very large
employers were to band together to form a purchasing consortium. To
the extent that the group has sufficient purchasing power to affect prices
and output within the pharmaceutical industry, we should be concerned
that investments in innovation would decrease.
The Department of Justice and FTC issued their joint Statements of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care in 1993. With respect to group
purchasing arrangements (“GPAs”), Statement 7 provides that “[m]ost
joint purchasing arrangements among hospitals or other health care
providers do not raise antitrust concerns. Such collaborative activities
typically allow the participants to achieve efficiencies that will benefit
consumers.”238 GPAs raise antitrust concerns only where the GPA
creates a monopsony, or power purchaser, that can exercise market
power with respect to the product or service239 or where the GPA
facilitates price fixing.240
Given the choice, plan sponsors will likely focus on their core
businesses, rather than take a hands-on role in the pharmacy benefit.241
Sponsors need information adequate to make rational decisions about
PBM value to create a market solution to transparency. To assess the
value of the PBM, a sponsor must know the true cost of the PBM service,
obviously more than the published per-transaction (administration) fee,
charged to the sponsor by the PBM.
The PBM takes three cash flows in the process of administering
prescription plans: PBMs retain a portion of the rebates (“RR”), spread
pricing (“SP”), and the per-prescription (or per-member) administration
fees (“ADM”). The PBM administration fees assessed are specified in the
contract and are not subject to variation in any given contract period. We

237
See generally Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W. Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects
of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 615
(2000); David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to Promote Network
Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 523 (1999).
238
U.S. Dept. of Justice & FTC, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care at
Statement 7 (Aug. 1996).
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Plan sponsors that wish to take a more active role should be prepared to hire a cadre
of specialists capable of auditing and overseeing the plan. These sponsors would also have
to contract out the processing of pharmacy claims, administration of their formulary,
negotiating with drug manufacturers and setting up a pharmacy network.
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can express the terms below in a mathematical expression describing
total cost of the PBM service:
RR + SP + ADM = Cost of the PBM service
Experienced consultants have watched the PBM industry, under
increasing pressure from the sponsors, give up a larger share of rebates
to sponsors. Therefore, PBMs have decreased the amount of rebate
retained (“RR”) as a portion of cash flow. In order for PBMs to meet
quarterly Wall Street expectations, they have increased spread pricing
(“SP”), mainly on generic drugs. Generic drug pricing is particularly
difficult to evaluate because generics typically have multiple prices and
the sponsor routinely lacks adequate information on a reasonable price
range. Complicating this system is the fact that some PBMs have several
different MAC price lists. The revised equation represents the current
state of PBM cash flows (i.e., cost of PBM service):
↓RR + ↑SP + →ADM = Cost of the PBM service
A market solution to PBM transparency requires the sponsor to have
sufficient knowledge to purchase PBM services rationally, with
information on price and quality. The following suggestions are
intended to facilitate the sponsor’s PBM selection and monitoring, by
positioning the plan sponsor to demand information previously
overlooked in contract negotiations. When a plan sponsor circulates a
request for proposals (“RFP”) to several PBMs, the RFP should require
the PBMs responding to it to represent that they will comply with each
of the following items. The sponsor might even attach to the RFP a form
of contract and require each PBM responding to the RFP to represent
that it will sign a contract in the form attached.
First, the sponsor should demand that the PBM provide a copy of all
the electronic prescription transactions performed for the sponsor in
each billing cycle. The PBM is in the business of transmitting electronic
transactions; it can easily remove personal information from the
transactions and deliver the requested information to the sponsor. PBMs
have sometimes warned sponsors that retrieving these transactions will
be very expensive. This argument is untenable. The PBM must have
aggregated the transactions in order to bill the sponsor. The Appendix
lists information that the plan sponsor should request.
Second, the PBM should be required to provide the sponsor with the
generic drug price list (“MAC”) and all subsequent updates to that MAC
list.
This step would probably require the sponsor to sign a
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confidentiality agreement with the PBM. Spreads generated by the PBM
on generic drug pricing likely represent the greatest challenge to
sponsors in the next several years. Having both the transactions and the
generic price list allows the sponsor to spot-check the prices being billed.
As stated earlier, it is quite likely that the plan sponsor will have a third
party check the pricing in a comprehensive exam. With the sponsor’s
data now available, a periodic exam of the firm’s data by an outside
vendor could prove to be a worthwhile investment.
Third, the PBM should be required to provide the sponsor with
accounting in adequate detail for the sponsor to confirm rebate
payments. This information would, likely, require a confidentiality
agreement by the sponsor. Pharmacy transactions exist in exquisite
detail; it is only reasonable to demand a straightforward accounting of
the payments that the sponsor’s transactions earned. PBMs often try to
limit plan sponsors to auditing only transactions involving a select list of
drugs or to auditing only transactions involving a small number of
drugs. The plan sponsor should insist that it or its designated auditor
have complete access to all information needed.
VI. Conclusion
The PBM industry has largely escaped public scrutiny because few
members of the public know of its existence or understand its processes.
It is one of the most powerful industries in the health care arena today,
yet it is ineffectively regulated by a patchwork of federal and state laws.
The most promising areas of legislation, disclosure statutes, have been
vehemently resisted by the PBMs. Further, these disclosure statutes are
far from an optimal solution, as different states pass different statutes.
Despite the issues in this industry, the federal government does not
appear poised to create a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Because of
the lack of appropriate regulation, a private sector solution appears to be
the best solution available at this time for health plans.
For health plans to negotiate effectively with PBMs, they must arm
themselves with the information necessary to level the playing field. The
current regime of information asymmetry prevents health plans from
negotiating the best terms possible with PBMs. The suggestions
provided in this article give health plan managers guidance regarding
the tools they need to equip themselves to negotiate more effectively
with PBMs in the future. In the absence of these steps, PBMs will be able
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to take advantage of health plan payors, resulting in higher
pharmaceutical costs for America’s employers and plan participants.
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APPENDIX
Suggested data elements to request from the PBM
NDC (National Drug Code)
Date dispensed
Drug name & strength
Quantity dispensed
Days supply
NABP # (Pharmacy Provider ID number)
Generic Flag (Generic/Brand identifier)
Ingredient Cost (Amount billed to the sponsor for drug ingredient)
Dispensing Fee (Amount paid to pharmacy for dispensing)
Co-payment Amount (Co-payment paid by member)
Amount Due from sponsor = (Ingredient Cost + Dispensing Fee) –
(Co-payment)
Reversal Flag (Reversal/Credit of transactions)
Mail/retail pharmacy indicator
Generic Product Indicator (GPI)
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